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MEXICAN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW*
DAVID CASARES N.**
INTRODUCTION

In this article sociological considerations must necessarily take a secondary position. It is, however, appropriate as a matter of introduction to
mention that the history, the social, political and juridical traditions,
and the mode of life of each country greatly influence the development of
its legal institutions. Without any question of superior or infcrior peoples
being raised, one must take account of the fact that each different people
will create a different juridical system. Each system will have its own
inherent characteristics and particular developments. Each will reach
results in its peculiar fashion. The system is adapted to the needs and
vicissitudes of the particular country, and it is controlled, among other
factors, by the rate of progress in that.country. Although the entire system
may be founded on the high principle of human liberty and dignity, and
even though it provides in general terms that the relationships between
men be governed by justice, both as to the individuals and to society at
large, the institutions that give life to these various general rights will be
as diverse as the environment in which they are applied is diverse.
This diversity in the means of satisfying the needs of the members of
society does not necessarily indicate a preference for one possible solution
as against another. The basic notions that all men are fundamentally equal
and that each is entitled to the fruits of his labor, plus the practice within
a given legal system and experience in certain cases in other legal systems
create a valuable sense of tradition which may become applicable, to a
certain extent, in a different environment. Mexico is an example of the
fashion in which these general ideas may function. It is a weak and relatively poor country that suffered from more than a century of political
turmoil. Its people face the task of merging two races, the Spanish and
the Indian. The former has the burden of assimilating the latter into
western civilization, its mode of life, and its other juridical patterns. All of
this makes Mexico a day-to-day complex crucible wherein these various
influences are melted down and a new tradition formed. Mexico inherited
her basic juridical tradition from Spain at a time when Spain was decadent.
In spite of this decadence during the period of Mexican independence
Spain had known the splendor of the 16th century, when its jurists corn*This article was written in Spanish. The Editors of the Miami Law Quarterly are
indebted to Prof. David S. Stern of the Inter-American Exchange Program of the University
of Miami for his invaluable assistance in revising the translation and preparing the article
for publication.
**Craduate, Escuela Libre de Derecho, Mxieo, D.; Member, Mexican Bar;
Member, Colegio de Abogados de Mbxico; Member, Board of Directors and Professor
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piled and saw enforced in the new world the wise and adequate Laws of the
Indies. Many centuries earlier it had also produced that monument of
scientific legal compilation known as "Las Siete Partidas."'
Since the basic Spanish legal tradition brought to Mexico was vigorous
and well developed, its life, during the many centuries of Spanish dominion
in the new world, went through various modifications. During the Colonial
period, especially in the 18th century and the early part of the 19th, as
well as at the time of declaration of Mexican independence, the French
ideas were propagated and came to have a very important influence on
both private and public law. This is particularly true of those notions
developed during the time of the French Revolution. While it was not
the only influence that can be observed in the codification of Mexican
Civil Law after the independence, the Napoleonic Code is without any
doubt the clearest and strongest single system of legal ideas contained
therein. From the same group of French theorists the leaders of the
Mexican Republic drew their knowledge of the notions elaborated in the
former English colonies, now established as the United States of America.
These ideas came to play an important part in the legal thinking of Mexico.
There is no question but what the brilliant course of the new American
Republic quickened in Mexico the desire for liberty. After the failure of
the ephemeral Empire of the liberator Iturbide, the first constitution, that of
1824, created a republican, representative, federal government. This government, democratic in notion and republican in form, represented an entirely
new idea to a country which had functioned during the entire Viceroyalty on
monarchical and centralized bases. It was unfortunate that these institutions
should have been adopted in a country where the inhabitants had had no
experience of participation in a representative government. After a struggle
that lasted nearly half a century, during which federalism and centralization
were the two main ideas contending for power, the Federal Republic finally
came into existence on the basis of the Constitution of 1857. This Constitution, established on the ashes of the frustrated Empire of Maximilian of
Hapsburg, followed the general pattern of the Constitution of 1824. Among
its many innovations, it created the famous constitutional proceeding known
as the "juicio de amparo." The juicio de amparo is a combination of habeas
corpus and injunction, which may be had in the courts to secure protection
from a violation of any right guaranteed in the Constitution to the individual citizen. This is a truly Mexican innovation in spite of some
similarities to the common law extraordinary writs.
The revolution that overthrew the lengthy regime of Porfirio Diaz
I. The Siete Partidas, or Seven Parts, was a compilation of the emerging new
national law of Spain by Alfonse the Wise. He was the king of Castile and Leon during
the second half of the 13th century. This codification had its roots in the Roman law,
but shared, to a very large extent, the common Germanic tradition established in Spain
by the Visigothic invaders.
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brought into being the present Constitution of Mexico, that of 1917.
Although this document has many new ideas, particularly in the fields of
social, property, agrarian and labor law, it is very similar to that of 1857
and continues the political tradition springing from the Constitution
of 1824.
It is unnecessary to insist on the importance of the influence of
American institutions upon Mexican constitutional developments. The
administrative law, notwithstanding some differences in rate of development, actual organization and procedure, takes its chapter heads from the
constitutional law. This was pointed out by the very learned French
author Bonnard.
ADMINIsTRATIv

ORGANIZATION

For purposes of studying the administrative organs, let us adopt, at
least provisionally, the formal definition that is given the administrative
function without considering its particular content. This definition is that
the function of administrative law in general is "the activity which the
state realizes through the executive branch of government." This simple
definition has been criticized on the basis of the fact that in certain
countries it ignores tile extreme decentralization which caused the President's Committee on Administrative Management, in the United States,
to remark that "the independent regulatory commission constitutes a
headless 'fourth branch' of the Government, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers."
The federal system that exists in Mexico establishes coordinate government in the federal and state areas, each being organized in a republican
fashion, democratic and representative, and each containing the usual
separation of powers: legislative, executive and judicial. The states are
independent as to all that concerns their internal affairs, but subordinate
to the federal power in that which is established as pertaining to the union.
Article 124 of the Federal Constitution establishes the different areas of
jurisdiction as between federal and state authority. It provides that all
powers not expressly vested by the Constitution in the federal authorities
are reserved to the states. Hence, since the general Constitution establishes
a separation of powers for both federal and state governments, it is clear
that the executive branch in the states, as well as in the central government, must perform administrative functions. The separation of power
established in the Constitution does not mean that the federal executive
has an exclusive monopoly on executive acts, nor that it is impossible for
it to intervene in functions that are really legislative or judicial. The
functions have been coordinated and the various branches of the government collaborate, and in effect have worked out a regime of separation
where the practical content of the various acts of the differing public
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powers does not coincide with the theoretical distribution into the three
coordinate branches.
According to the Mexican Constitution the government must be based
on the powers expressly stipulated in the Constitution itself. It is impossible
that any authorities other than those envisioned by the Constitution can
be created under the Constitution. The second important principle is that
all the various branches, and consequently all authorities established under
them, have only the powers which the Constitution and the laws made in
pursuance thereof grant them. This grant must be either express or reasonably implied. The third important principle is that a discretionary power
is an exception, while the normal rule is that the executive may only act
within the terms of express powers. As a result of this principle of strict
constructionism, the head of the executive and his auxiliaries in the
administrative branch can act solely in compliance with the Constitution
and within the limits of the laws made thereunder. It is only in the light
of this general notion of a rigidly developed constitution, that that which
will follow can be understood.
FORMAL

CLASSIFICATION

OF

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS

In the broad sense administrative acts are all manifestations of the
knowledge or the will (actos de conocirniento o de voluntad) of the administrative organs which produce a juridical effect-that is, acts which create,
modify or extinguish obligations, rights, or simple lawful situations. If
this definition is examined more closely, it will be seen that in this sense
regulations as well as decrees are acts of administration since both emanate
from the executive branch. It is submitted that Barth6lemy's idea that
they belong in the administrative category is correct because their purpose
is "to insure order and procure the performance of the laws." Notwithstanding the general character of administrative regulations, their main
function is to delineate the law and to guide in its development so that
it will realize the basic object of all legislation-the proper functioning of
society in all its branches. In contradistinction to this notion of Barth6lemy,
which I share, the abstract and general character of administrative regula.
tions has led many of the modern theorists to say that they are more in
the nature of "law." The fundamental notion of a law is that it consists in
the supposition by the legislature of an abstract situation and the attribution of certain juridical effects to the control of that case from the societal
standpoint. These theorists hold that it has the character of a legislative
enactment even though it emanates from an administrative organ and is
formally labeled administrative.
Due to the tremendous importance that the regulation plays in the
administrative law, it should be given special consideration. Since regulations are provisions of a general character serving as an instrument for
the application of a law, it has been suggested by some that there is little
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object in adding one abstract provision to another of the same kind.
However, if one takes into account the fact that the legislative power is
vested in a congress, divided into two chambers, meeting only intermittently, and having a deliberative purpose underlying its general work, the
need for regulations becomes obvious. Usually, and it is convenient that
this is true, laws do not enter into the minute fashion in which they may
be applied, because the legislators do not have an immediate experience
with the practical enforcement of the law. It is also because they are
attempting to establish an abstract or general principle which appears
reasonably calculated to accomplish the end that they have in mind. The
regulation then is to assist in the execution of this general idea called a
law. The regulation permits the purposes of the authors of the law to be
realized, giving the manner of enforcement a sufficient flexibility, and at
the same time a general fairness and uniformity. There is in addition the
factor that the administrator is supposed to be an enlightened and highly
trained person with direct and continuous association in the practical
execution of any legal enactment. It is socially desirable that the general
body of the law be stable and lasting. Constant amendment of the fundamentil law constitutes a great evil due to the disturbances produced by
innovations in the social relationships. The administrative regulation contributes to the stability and general fairness of the law because a regulation
may be rapidly changed and, while respecting at all times the principle
established in the law, adapts it to the changing conditions of society
through the manner of applying it. The legislative function would be
extremely difficult, if not possibly sterile, oppressive and dangerous, if it
did not have the assistance of the administrative regulations.
CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF TIE ADMINISTRATIVE

LAw

Article 92 of the Federal Constitution makes it clear that the President
has the power to enforce the laws through regulations when it states: "All
regulations, decrees, and orders of the President must be signed by the
secretary of the executive department to which the matter pertains .... -2
However, this leaves unsolved the question whether the President is capable
of acting without specific authorization by the legislative branch of the
government. Mexican constitutional historians now agree that the head
of the executive branch is authorized to dictate regulations without the
necessity of a special order from the legislative branch in each case. This
doctrine is taken from Section 1 of Article 89 of the Constitution, which
grants the President the power "to promulgate and execute the laws
enacted by Congress, providing within the administrative sphere for their
faithful observance." 3
The expression is not a happy one and the following background is
2. 2 PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS Or NATIONS

3. Id. at 442.

443-444 (1950).
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needed in order to understand it. The history of the Constitution shows
us that the earlier provisions contained in Article 85, Section IV, of the
so-called Organic Bases of 1843 had a far clearer and more precise statement of the function of the President in this regard. It stated: "The
President of the Republic shall issue orders and regulations necessary for
the execution of the laws, without altering or modifying them."
Inexplicably, when the Constitution of 1857 was drawn up, this excellent statement contained in the Organic Bases was forgotten and for it
the present formula, contained in the Constitution now in force, was substituted. The expresion, "execute the laws enacted by Congress providing,
within the administrative sphere, for their faithful obscrvance," serves to
explain the theoretical development of the administrative regulation in
Mexico in the following regards:
(a) The nature of the power to issue regulations.
(b) The need of a specific law in order that this power exist,
with the sole exception of police regulation.
(c) Restrictions on the power to issue regulations.
(d) The fact that this grant of power to issue regulations is a
constitutional one.
Each of these four subdivisions of the general nature of administrative
regulation will be discussed.
As to (a): In some countries, among them the United States, it has
been maintained that administrative regulations, due to their abstract
nature, are really laws enacted by the executive under a general delegation
of legislative authority. The text of the Mexican Constitution makes this
rationalization impossible. Article 49 of the Constitution expressly provides: "The supreme power of the federation is divided into the legislative,
executive and judicial branches. Two or more of these powers cannot be
united in one person or corporation, nor can the legislative authority be
vested in one individual, except in the case of extraordinary powers delegated to the executive in accordance with the provisions of Article 29. In
no other case shall extraordinary powers be granted to the executive to
4
legislate.'
The exception mentioned in Article 29" is that of an emergency
arising from an invasion, a serious disturbance of the public peace, a
serious internal danger or social conflict. In such an event Congress may,
by means of a law, suspend certain individual guarantees and authorize
the President to dictate general measures necessary to control the situation
rapidly and easily. It is necessary to allude to the last sentence of the
aforementioned Article 29. This sentence incorporates an amendment
made in 1938 with the specific purpose of ending the vicious congressional
practice of delegating extraordinary legislative power to the President to
4. Id. at 431.
5. For full text see 2

PEASLEF,

op. cit. supra note 2, at 427.
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legislate on certain subject matters without there being an emergency.
This delegation was based on the broad notion that the legislature retained
its general power since it had only delegated certain specific powers, and
that the specific power delegated did not merge in the person of the
President, nor did it become vested in him. There is no question but that
the amendment of Article 29 was necessary due to particular Mexican
circumstances. It is, therefore, clear that the United States' rationalization
of the administrative function is not possible because of the express prohibition in the Mexican Constitution. The division of powers appears to be
absolute.
Article 89 shows that although the making of regulations has its legislative side, the division of the various branches is not so inelastic as to
keep from the Chief Executive all power to make regulations. That is
precisely why the Constitution draws a distinction between the making of
laws and the execution of the laws already made. The formula that is
employed differentiates these two things very clearly, and hence the
President is empowered to use adequate means to obtain the proper
observance of the laws. The most adequate means to accomplish this is
in the administrative branch of the government through detailed determination of the mode and circumstances for compliance with the general
legislative purpose.
As to point (b) above, the language used in Article 89 makes it clear
that, although regulations resemble laws greatly, the regulation requires a
prior law in order to exist. Regulations do not impose obligations or grant
rights. They cannot increase or restrict the legitimate sphere of action of
private individuals since the function of making laws which can so affect
the rights of individuals is reserved to Congress by the Constitution. This
reservation is contained in Article 73,0 where it is set forth that Congress
alone has the power to legislate. It is even more clearly expressed in the
various articles containing the fundamental basic rights of individuals
where the only possibility of limiting said rights is reserved to laws7 and
only in certain instances may such a limitation be made even in the form
of a law. What this means in plain language is that, in addition to the
obligation of the President to respect the Constitution, the enforcement of
that Constitution is provided for in the general laws made by the Legislature,
and the enforcement of the laws made by the Legislature is provided for
in the administrative regulations made by the Executive. To this constitutional provision that it is a function of the Legislature to determine the
cases and conditions for the enforcement of general precepts and the
6. It is contained particularly in §§ VI and XXX and by implication in all the
other sections. See 2 PEASLEE, OpJ.cit. supra note 2, at 435-439.
7. For the basic civil liberties see those contained in Art. 1, 4-10; and the due
process clauses in Art. 14 and 16. 2 PEASLEE, op. cit. supTa note 2, at 415-418. See also
n. 11 infra. The text of Art. 14 is at n. 12 infra and that of Art. 16 at n. 13 infra.
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method of putting into effect the legislative mandate, there is only one
exception. This is contained in the provisions that permit the making of
police-type regulations. Since these may be made directly by the Executive
without the intervention of the Legislature, they are denominated autonomous regulations. Article 103 prohibits the carrying of arms within inhabited
places without complying with police regulations. Article 211 allows the
administrative authorities (executive, municipal, etc.) to punish noncompliance by fine or detention for a period not exceeding 36 hours.
Some authors, as mentioned above, are of the opinion that the administrative regulation bears the same relationship toward the law as the
latter does toward the Constitution. If the notion is accepted that the
Constitution is nothing but an empty formula without specific purpose,
limited to defining "the competence of the various powers," then it is
impossible that the relationship of law to Constitution is the same as
that of regulation to law, because the Constitution would not envision any
end whereas the law would. If, however, it is seen that the Constitution
is the means for defining the nature of the State and that among its other
purposes it has that of setting forth the reasons for the existence of the
State, then it can be seen that the laws do nothing but set forth in greater
detail the ends which the State must achieve in each branch of government through activity of a specific nature, and that the regulations develop
these ends to their ultimate consequences.
As to (c) above: In dealing with the question of the restrictions of
the power to issue regulations, Section I of Artikle 89 makes it clear that
certain limitations exist. If in issuing the regulation the President is
obligated to provide for the exact observation of the law, then it is impossible for any regulation to contradict, expand or restrict the content of a
law or to attempt to achieve an end different from the one stated in the
legal enactment. This is made very clear by the content of Article 72(f), 10
which provides that "The same formalities as are required for the enactmient of laws shall be observed in their interpretation, amendment or
repeal."
The matter of the nature of the limitations of an administrative regulation is not, however, as simple as this. Many times the law is very succinct
and, in order to execute it, the regulations must necessarily place restrictions
on the rights, must set forth specific obligations or grant powers which are
not expressed in the law. The prevailing theory in Mexico today, established by the jurisprudence (decided or settled case law) of the Supreme
Court, gives two basic principles for judging the constitutionality of such a
regulation: the first deals with the nature of the law itself and the second
with the nature of the regulation. The law, in order to be capable of
8. 2 PEASLEE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 417.
9. Id. at 420.
10. Id. at 435.
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administration through regulations, must state precisely all of the fundamental elements of fact to which a judicial consequence is to be attributed.
Thus, at least the fundamental criteria must be established as well as the
means for taking legal action on the basis of said criteria.
An example may be taken from the field of taxation. If the object of
the tax, the fact that it is taxable and the rate are not specified, the law
cannot be administered. It is not sufficient to state that 'one must pay a
tax if the purpose or reason for paying the tax and the quantity of the tax
are not stated. These last elements are absolutely requisite in order that
the executive branch may proceed to collect it. If they are not stated, the
latter would then have to complete the element of the law that had been
omitted, and this has been ruled by the Supreme Court to be the equivalent
of legislating.
The nature of the regulation must be such that it respects the spirit
of the law and works along with it. The regulation must assume its various
hypotheses and establish the means of compliance with the law. This may
be done either directly or indirectly as long as the understanding and
action of the Executive is reasonbly in accordance with the main purpose
of the law. Again let us take an example from the field of taxation. The
law taxes the execution of a certain type of contract in a fixed quantity,
payable by both contracting parties. There is thus a stipulation as to who
and how much must be paid. Nothing has been stated as to the means
of payment. The regulation can validly establish that the tax may be
paid either in cash or in tax stamps. Tie regulation might establish that
notice be given to the office of the tax collector, since the tax collector
will have handled various other cases envisioned by the same law and he
may have established general routines for the collection of the various
types of income entrusted to him. It would not authorize the President,
however, to bring in new elements conditioning this responsibility to pay
taxes foreign to the general objects of the law, nor could lie establish greater
obligations than those imposed or include more people or more types of
contracts than those which are reasonably within the purview of the legislation as literally read.
Finally, consider category (d) which deals with the constitutional
nature of the power to issue regulations. The basic point to be stated here
is that the faculty of regulation is vested solely in the President of the
Republic. The Mexican Congress cannot, as can the Congress in the
United States, delegate the power to regulate a particular law to an administrative agency created by the law itself. In such a situation Congress
itself would violate the Constitution as clearly as would the President in
the making of a regulation entirely foreign to the purpose of a particular
law. The power to enforce the laws is exclusively one belonging to the
President. There is a corollary which must be stated, and that is that
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neither can he delegate the power since the statement contained in the
Constitution is an express statement that the President shall see to the
enforcement of the laws. It has been resolved by the Supreme Court in
its decided case law that "in conformity with our constitutional system,
the legislative branch alone has the power to enact laws with the sole
exception that the President nay' exercise his regulatory functions when
dealing with police regulations. Also, that the Executive cannot delegate
any power given him under a general law unless there exists in the Constitution a provision authorizing him to delegate the power to another person
or entity, for not even the Legislature itself can authorize a delegation
without the specific authority contained in the Constitution."
This strict construction of the constitutional language by the Supreme
Court seriously limits the possibility of administrative decentralization.
When the latter becomes more necessary, as it will, the obstacle will have
to be removed either by judicial interpretation or by direct amendment of
the Constitution.
All of the above should not give the impression that at the present
there are not some regulations emanating from decentralized public authorities. Although they may not be called regulations, the circulars of the Bank
of Mexico, pursuant to Article 32 of its charter, fix the minimum and maximum rates of interest that private banks are allowed to charge their clients.
Under the present rule of the Supreme Court, however, there is a serious
question as to the constitutionality of these "circulars." In order for them
to survive it will be necessary that the Supreme Court change its rule.
As to circulars in general, it should be added that any orders addressed
by administrative officers to their subordinates wherein are stated general
measures for the internal administration of the particular matters of their
care, pursuant to the laws and regulations, is not an exercise of the regulatory function because they neither establish new rights or obligations, nor
do they envision such a possibility. The mere instruction of a subordinate
so that he comply in a unifonn fashion with the juridical rules established is
not an unconstitutional assumption of the regulatory powers.
Tr THEORY OF THE AnINIsTRATrvE ACT IN MEXICAN LAW
At the outset of this article it was stated that the administrative act in
a broad sense is any manifestation of knowledge or will by an administrative
organ that produces a juridical effect-that is, that creates, modifies, or extinguishes an obligation, right or a simple lawful situation. Within this
definition, which is purely formal and subjective, is included the regulation.
The regulation, as has already been explained, is in actuality a legislative
function entrusted to the administrative power. In a strict sense, therefore,
an administrative act always has the immediacy of a specific execution of a
particular law. That is, it establishes a particular juridical effect that must

456
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be derived from that law and must, in its turn, change the nature of obligations, rights or lawful situations.
The administrative act may be divided into the following elements:
1. The authority or person to whom the act is attributed.
2. The declaration of the knowledge or of the will of the authority.
3. The content of the declaration.
4. The reason for the declaration.
5. Its form.
Each of these elements will be considered in detail.
First, the author of the administrative act is always the State through
the administrative agency or through any other public or private entity
which may have received the authority to perform a particular activity
coming within its jurisdiction. Thus, the following can be the sources of
administrative acts too; the decentralized public institutions and private
individuals in charge of public functions. The latter, however, are included
only in certain cases when there is a question of immediate and direct public
interest.
In order for the acts of the authority to be valid, it must have jurisdiction. In this sense, jurisdiction is defined as the field of activity, objectively
viewed, granted by law to a particular organ of the State. The second precondition for the validity of the act is the capacity of the subject. This consists in either an aggregate of conditions de facto or de jure such that, in
pursuance of the law, the government officer or person in question has the
power to make his declaration effective. In accordance with the law, jurisdiction is normally determined by the subject matter, by the territory, and
by action at the level of the agency. The capacity of the agent is comparable to that of an individual in private law. Any natural or legal incapacity,
such as insanity, or any impediments, such as duress, will be the cause for
nullity of the act of a government official just as it would be of a private
individual.
The subject matter of an administrative act can be either simple or
complex. Acts are simple when they proceed from one entity, regardless of
whether the will of that entity is identified with an individual or with a
corporate body. They are complex when the manifestations are the aggregate of facts done simultaneously or successively by different administrative
agencies, either through the agencies acting alone or in collaboration with
private individuals. The normal administrative act is unilateral in the sense
that it represents the imposition of the will of the State on the will or wills
of an individual or individuals. Although there are times when the validity
of the act requires its acceptance by the individuals, it is never bilateral in
the sense of the absolute equality which exists in private law; for example,
in the making of a simple contract.
In spite of this generalization, there are administrative acts that are
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bilateral and even polilateral. Typical of these would be the contracts or
compacts between various public entities dealing with each other on an
equal footing.
The second aspect of the administrative act is the declaration of the
will of the agency. This declaration must always be a voluntary manifestation or external realization of certain legal presuppositions. By its very
nature it is susceptible of the same defects as any private voluntary act.
Duress, violence, material mistake, fraud or deceit will all vitiate the will of
the administrative agent exactly as they do that of a private person. The
declarations have a dual aspect. They may become a matter of public
administrative law if they treat of a manifestation of will designed to accomplish a certain end known and recognized in the law, or they may be simple
administrative acts if they represent merely the expression of will or knowledge having various possible effects, none of which is designed to accomplish
any specific end of the law.
The general nature of the manifestation of the will is also divided in
two different ways. If it deals with a specific case and proposes a specific
sanction, that is, if it is controlled by circumstances which have already
occurred-such as the imposition of a fine on one guilty of certain conductit ,is a binding or a vested act. If, however, the nature of the manifestation
makes clear that it awaits an opportunity to be applied or that it can only
be applied in the event that certain other things happen, it is a discretionary
act. The practical consequences of this distinction are incalculable.
The third subdivision with which we deal is the content of the administrative act. This refers both to the nature of the subject matter (health
regulations, patents, etc.) and to the type of act, for example, the granting
of a concession or the expropriation of a particular piece of property. The
object of an act may be either positive or negative; may be within the private
law or within the public law. Public administrative acts, it must be noted,
in contradistinction to private contracts, are all nominate. The variety and
possible number of combinations of such acts is sufficiently small that they
may be divided into a specific number of categories.
The enumeration of administrative acts which follows is based on
Fraga's adapation of the classification made by Zambini. First are those
designed to increase the juridical or legal capacity of the individual. These
include: (a) the granting of access to an institution, organization or professional group, and allowing the person the rights and advantages of this particular service of a public nature (such as the reception of a person into an
institution of learning or a public charity); (b) the consent given by a
superior to an inferior in order that be may exercise a particular power; (c)
the removal, waiver or renunciation permitting non-compliance with an
obligation by an individual or granting him leave not to fulfill a requisite
generally envisioned by the law in its normal course (such as the reduction
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of a tax due to the poverty of the individual taxpayer); (d) licenses, permits
or other authorization which makes it possible for the individual to exercise
a pre-existing right subject to public control; and (e) concessions. Concessions are divided into those which create status, the constitutive (such as the
granting of nationality), and those which transfer a property right, the
translative (such as the giving of the power to perform a public function to
a private individual, whether it be the rendering of a service or the exploitation of a property for the public benefit).
The second basic category of public administrative acts is composed
of those designed to restrict the legal powers of private individuals. It includes: (a) rules imposed upon individuals such as general prohibitions or
orders containing either negative or affirmative obligations; (b) penalties
and other forms of enforced execution of administrative acts including
suspension or total deprivation of a right due to non-compliance with another
administrative order (fines, arrests and cancellation of concessions); and (c)
the expropriation or unilateral conveyance of property for the public use.
This latter may be total or may be merely a restriction on the ownership,
such as a temporary occupation or the creation of an easement in various
categories of people with the right of user.
To be contrasted with the two general categories of public administrative
business are the simple administrative acts. These produce varying legal
effects, but are not aimed at any particular one. Typical of them are acts of
authentication, certification, registration and the communication of orders,
summonses, declarations and the publications of proceedings in any general
category of action. It should be noted that administrative acts are general if
they have an abstract character, such as a circular, and they are particular
if they are addressed to certain persons, as in the establishment of a concession. They are internal if their effects are limited to the administration
itself, and external if designed to have effect on private individuals.
The fourth element in describing the nature of the administrative acts
is the purpose for which the act is realized. Generally speaking, the purpose
is either immediate or ultimate, but in both senses the administration must,
in proposing a given act, be realizing something in the public interest. The
definition of purpose has caused a great deal of discussion in Mexican law.
It is divided into two parts, the juridical or legal purpose and the natural
purpose. The immediate end to be served by the administrative act is called
the legal purpose. The more remote or ultimate purpose to be achieved by
an administrative act is labeled the natural purpose or, sometimes,
the motivation. If the government grants a concession for the exploitation
of public property, its immediate purpose is to acquire the obligation of the
concessionaire. Its ultimate purpose is to achieve the better exploitation of
the public domain. As will be explained hereafter, the term "motivate,"
in its constitutional sense, has been defined as the particular fact or facts
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which induced the administration to act in a particular case. The general
element, "purpose," is of great importance when dealing with discretionary
administrative acts since, if there is a violation of the purpose in the means
used to realize the act, the administrative agency may be guilty of "excessive
use of power."
The fifth and final element of the administrative act is the form in
which the declaration is issued. This presents serious points leading to the
evaluation of its efficacy and its validity. The general rule is that an administrative act must be a solemn act, that is to say, that no administrative act
exists unless expressed in the manner provided in the law. It does not go
so far, however, as to establish that the administrative act must be sacramental, always employing certain predetermined formulas. Article 16 of the
Constitution provides that no person shall be disturbed in his person, house
or possessions, except under the authority of a written order,11 but certain
acts may not only be oral, such as a police order in the street, but tacit,
based on phenomena that are unmistakable, such as the sound of a siren or a
stop-and-go light, if by prior regulation the significance of the siren sound
or the stop-and-go light is clear and unmistakable. As an instrument, the
act must fulfill certain fonnal prerequisites, that is, there must be a statement
that an opinion has been requested or there must be a statement of the
purpose, either de facto or de jure, envisioned by Article 16, and there
must be a signature since we are dealing with an instrument.
Silence itself has no legal meaning and, therefore, to interpret the silence
recourse must be had to the law. The law sometimes may provide a negative meaning, at other times an affirmative meaning, and quite frequently no
meaning at all.
Article 8 of the Constitution, for example, provides for the right of
petition. Its efficacy has been limited, however, to a requirement that the
public authority must answer a petition within a very short time. If no
answer is forthcoming, the constitutional right of amparo may be exercised,
but no particular significance is given in that proceeding to the silence of
the public authority.
THE

NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

The administrative process was called into existence by the manifold
requirements of the modem state. The essential nature of the process is
that it must act to serve the public interest. The public interest requires
speed, informality, a certain secrecy, and a certain responsibility on the part
of its officials in carrying out the public administration without obstacle or
delay. Taking into account the tremendous power which can be concentrated in administrative agencies, the judicial branch has intervened quite
strongly to protect the rights and interests of private individuals, especially
in democratic countries where there is a felt need for the harmonizing of
11. See note 7 supra.
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efficient public service with the protection due to private persons against
illegality and arbitrariness. Just as the administrative process has called
forth judicial influence, so has the administrative process influenced the
legislative. Mexico participates in this universal phenomenon along with the
rest of the modem democracies.
Judicial intervention leading to control of the administrative process is
easily understood if viewed against the background of the liberal regime of
the second half of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth century.
The main characteristic of the liberalism of that time was the limited intervention of the State in the life of the private individual. There was, additionally, an inclination of the prevailing political theories to require that all
actions by the State be subject to some control in a judicial proceeding. This
was especially easy due to the fact that the administrative law was in its
infancy and when it began to come forth as a specialized part of the executive function, the pattern was already well established that administrative
procedure follow judicial procedure' Even where the administrative procedure managed to escape from judicial control, it was still heavily influenced
by it. It is peculiar, in view of the 20th century development of greater
concentration of power in the authorities designed to serve the collective
interests in contradistinction to the private interests, that the protection of
the private individual has survived and even increased. The principal
achievement of this countermovement designed to protect the individual
from the administrative agencies has been the systematization of administrative procedure, coordinating as it does the demands of the public interest
with the protection of private rights and interests as far as is deemed necessary. In the process of simplifying the administrative procedure, it has
necessarily drawn away from its judicial parent on many points. The important thing to be observed is that even in drawing away protections are
raised to require some satisfactory settlement of a controversy, although that
controversy would not be a justiciable one.
The fundamental characteristic of the administrative act is the creation
of obligations or the limitation of rights of a private individual without the
necessity of judicial intervention. Some cases, however, are still left to the
judges. Many examples can be cited of the special administrative act following the modern pattern set forth in the preceding paragraph. Typical are
the procedures contained in the Tax Code of the Republic and the other
tax laws, the laws governing mines, petroleum resources, the various means
of transportation and communication, the public domain and water supply.
As to all of these types of property, the administrative procedure deals with
the modification, the granting or the cancellation of concessions for the
exploitation of public property or a public service. Further examples are
contained in the laws controlling patents, trade marks, trade names and other
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industrial property, and in the law regulating the expropriation of properties,
either on a limited or on a permanent basis.
Even though a particular act may have all of the characteristics of a
valid administrative act and may be done in accordance with the procedure
contained in any one of the laws mentioned above, it may still lack effectiveness, and this lack of effectiveness may be attacked in a judicial or administrative proceeding. This has been previously mentioned when we dealt with
the question of a condition precedent to an authorization or to an irregularity,
such as any one of the defects pointed out regarding the capacity or the
exercise of the will. Administrative law itself may not provide a means for
attacking acts which have prima facie validity because they fulfill the formal
requisites. But the Constitution sets forth the general attack which may be
made on an act having any such substantive defect through the means of
the amparo.
Tan NATunE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ACT, ITS EFFICACY AND
CAUSES OF ITS NuLLIY
Two of the requisites for an effective administrative act have already
been discussed. First, the existence of an administrative agency authorized
by law to perform the kind of acts under consideration and, second, the
existence of individuals capable of exercising the administrative function in
the given situation.

Assuming the satisfaction of these two basic prerequisites, the next
step in considering the development of a particular administrative act must
be the discovery of a subject matter that can be acted on by the particular
agency. The verification of the existence of a case that is subject to the
administrative action may be either ex officio or at the request of the party.
As in all other phenomena regulated by the Mexican legal system, an
express statement will be found in the legislation, establishing whether the
initiative is left to the competent agency or to another agency or to a party
in interest.

There are many examples of each of these possibilities.

The

law may give the power of verification of facts and evaluation of the circumstances to the agency itself. These, if found to exist in a certain case, will

permit administrative action without more. Such is the normal situation
in the United States, where the agency both judges the facts and arranges
for the corrective measures. In other laws, it is provided that the agency
must request certificates or opinions from technical or consultative agencies
so that the factual situation may be independently ascertained.
In still other cases an opportunity to be heard must be granted private
individuals whose vested rights will be affected by the administrative action.

They may come forward to give their opinion or to present opposition to
the particular act which the agency is about to undertake. Typical would be
the instances where the Chambers of Commerce are consulted in connection
with particular administrative measures or where, on the petition for the
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registration of a patent, other holders of similar patents must come forward
to present opposition if they consider that their rights will be affected.
It is frequently left to the discretion of the agency which is about to
act to ask for the advice or not to ask for it; to follow it after it has been
asked for, or not to follow it. There are even times when it is obliged to
ask for the opinions of outside parties and must follow them. In any
situation where the administrative act will effect a substantive right of a
private individual in contradistinction to a mere interest, the Supreme Court
has held that the administrative agency must observe the essential formalities
of a recognizance; that the private person must be given "the right to be
heard."
An example of such a situation would be where an individual is already
in a category that would allow him to use a public service, but he does
not have the affirmative legal right to demand that right of user because his
interest as a private individual is only protected indirectly and the public
interest, the existence of the service, is protected directly. Were the administrative agency to remove him from the category even though he had never
been given this specific right of user, he would be entitled to "the right to
be heard."
The "right to be heard" consists of the following formalities:
1. That the party to be affected be advised of the time when
the proceedings will be initiated, and that the object of the proceedings be stated, and that he be given an opportunity to present all
possible arguments in defense of his rights.
2. That along with the arguments, he may offer the proofs
which correspond with them, subject to reasonable control by the
agency.
3. That at the termination of the administrative proceedings,
he be given the opportunity to summarize his position, that is, to
to relate the proofs with the facts to which they refer and the
totality of proofs plus facts to the applicable law; and
4. That a decision be rendered on the subject matter of the
proceedings consistent with that which has been proven durirg it,
and that the manner of execution of this decision be set forth in
full accordance with the law under which it is taken.
The Supreme Court has stated that all of the above form parts of those
basic rights guaranteed private persons by Article 14,12 the second paragraph of which reads: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, possessions, or rights without a trial by a duly created court, in which
the essential elements of proper procedure have been observed, and in
accordance with laws issued prior to the act."
In his Treatise on Administrative Law, Professor Fraga pointed out that
before 1942 the case law interpreting Article 14 had established merely that
the constitutional requirement demanded that the administrative agency act
12. Ibid; 2 PEASLEE, opi. cit. supra note 2, at 418.
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in accordance with the procedure stipulated by the law under which it was
acting. After that year, however, on the basis of a decision by the Supreme
Court, the constitutional requirements of Article 14 were broadened to include the law itself. That is, it was no longer sufficient for the agency
merely to comply with what was laid down in the law. The law must conform with the requisites which have previously been stated or the entire
proceeding will be unconstitutional. The thesis on which this rule is based
was first stated in a judgment in the amparo proceeding filed by the Cia.
Industrial de Guadalajara,where the Court stated: "If the guaranty consecrated in Article 14 of the Constitution is to be of any value, then not
only the administrative authorities must be obligated to comply with the provisions of the law, but the legislative authority as well, so that the laws
establish an adequate procedure in which the parties may be heard. Except
in those cases stipulated by the Constitution in an expropriation which
is administrative in nature and in the collection of taxes, subject to
the principle "solve et repetc," the laws must provide for a hearing and a
defense for all parties in interest in all administrative acts . . . The idea of

the Constitution is that, in any trial conducted by the administrative authorities in which an individual may be deprived of private rights, be must be
given the opportunity, before said deprivation, to be heard and to present
an adequate defense."
Article 16' a provides a further safeguard for the individual when it
states: "No one shall be molested in his person, family, domicile, papers or
possessions, except on the basis of a written order of the competent authority
stating the legal grounds and the justification for the action taken."
This makes it obvious that the declaration of the circumstances which
lead to the application of the law must be made in a specific form. Where
the act is a simple one, e.g., of an individual authority, there need be no
more explanation than the declaration of the knowledge of the facts, the
demand for compliance with a particular law and the assertion of a public
right. If, on the other hand, it is a complex act-that of a group-the
applicable law by its terms will require the fulfillment of the following requisites: a statement that the members of the group were called, the fact of
their meeting on a certain date and at a certain place, that a quorum was
present, that a good and proper ballot was had (generally a secret ballot),
that the majority, or unanimous, vote necessary in order to have a decision
was arrived at, and that all of the foregoing has been recorded in proper
minutes signed by the parties required to sign.
If the complex act is the result of parties acting on an equal basis, it is
usually signed by all of them without any fixed order. If it is a result of
the combined action of a superior and an inferior, it will first be signed by
the person who suggested the particular action. A serious problem has been
13. See note 7 supra and 2

PEASLEE,

op. cit. supra note 2, at 418-419 for entire text.
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created by the fact that administrative decisions are usually taken by an
officer not generally familiar with the facts on which they are based. This
division of responsibility between the officer who enforces the act and the
person who finds the facts on which the enforcement is based makes it extremely difficult for the individual to protect himself from the administrative agency.
Before proceeding, it should be pointed out that the requirement of
communication, summons or publication is really subsequent to the completion of the act itself. They have more to do with eventual efficacy of the
act than with the formal validity of the act, because failure to comply with
these post-action requisites may not destroy the validity of the entire proceeding. At this time it should also be mentioned that the acts controlling the
parties after the principal action has been taken do not form a part of the
principal act. They are other administrative actions accessory to the principal action and it makes no difference whether they are judicial, administrative, preventive, subsequent or substitutive of one form of control for another. It is pointed out, however, because the acts of control may affect the
validity and at times the efficacy of the main administrative action.
As to the time when the administrative action becomes effective there
are two rules. First, if the action is a simple one it produces its effect as
soon as it is perfected. If the act is subject to a condition precedent, then'
as long as the time suspending it lasts or until the condition has been fulfilled it will not produce any effects. The same is true if any of the essential
prerequisites envisioned by the law have not been fulfilled, such as enforcement action, communication or a summons.
In exceptional cases, administrative acts may be retroactive if the decision stipulates this effect, subject to the limitations contained in Article 14
which prohibits any retroactive effect if that be to the detriment of any
person. Even after the act has become effective, its effects may be suspended if there is a decision by the same authority to do so or by another
authority, either administrative or judicial. The suspension, however, can
only take place in the express cases provided for by the law.
The efficacy of an act may also terminate with the passage of time in
its natural sense. This may be where the purpose to be accomplished by
the administrative action has already been fulfilled; where an expiration date
was set and that date has already passed; where a condition subsequent has
been realized; or due to the death, the removal from office, the abandonment
of the office or the position taken by the party affected, The agency itself
may revoke the particular act because of the non-compliance with another
bilateral act entered into with the party or for some motive not foreseen
at the time the administrative action was taken. In addition to all of these
other means of terminating the efficacy of an act, there may be a declaration
of nullity of the particular act in question by a superior authority.
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If the action of the administrative agency becomes effective, the man ifestation of that efficacy is the most interesting part of the process. As has
already been stated in connection with the effect on private individuals, the
nature of the act can be: (1) to prove the facts or establish their juridical
nature; (2) to broaden the sphere of action allowed private individuals or to
confer upon them rights; or (3) to restrict the sphere of action or impose
upon the individuals certain obligations.
The most important characteristic of the effect of administrative acts
is that it gives this branch of the government the power in many cases to
impose duties and restrictions upon private individuals and even to coerce
their performance without any necessity for judicial intervention. The government, in many cases, therefore, may take justice into its own hands.
In theory, this executive character of the administrative decision is based
on the power of the state as authority due to the allegiance of the subject.
It is of the essence of the need to give the government a means to fulfill
the requirements of public interest entrusted to it that any obstacle be removed that may be put in the way by private interests. This power to command is accompanied by the prerogative consisting of the presumption of
legitimacy which the acts have as against those rights existing in the merely
private sphere.
All this seri'es to give the public law its exceptional nature as compared
with the rights derived from the private law. But, it can be seen that the general result, the application of this public power through the administrative
agency, is very similar to that reached by a judicial decision. The difference
is that the former is not limited to the parties, nor does it have any effect of
res judicata as the latter has. The administrative act is not intended to
establish rights as between parties, nor does it aim at any particular minority
in its definition of right. Its main purpose is to realize the needs created
by the public interest. In realizing the demands of the public interest it
cannot act case by case, but must establish a general rule which is highly
variable. There is an exception to the effect of all administrative action,
and that is where an individual is granted a specific right on the basis of the
Constitution or the laws enacted thereunder. If the right is specially protected, then the government cannot affect it without complying fully with
the requisites that the administrative proceeding must begin with the opportunity to hear and defend and that, if the administrative agency acts, the
deprivation of the right can only be after a due and proper administrative
or judicial proceeding.
The doctrine of the administrative procedure in Mexico is based,
in brief, on several articles of the Constitution. Article 89, Section 1,
gives the President the power to execute the laws providing, in the
administrative realm, for their faithful observance. This is understood
to mean that he can carry out all resolutions with the sufficiency of a
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complete head of a department in its own sphere, and includes those
powers which would, be judicial if the judicial authority were to be
divided.
In Article 14, as previously mentioned, proceedings under
the law are applied to control the administrative authorities. There is a
limitation on this principle established in Article 17,"4 forbidding the individual from taking the law into his own hands or resorting to violence in
the enforcements of his rights. Article 21 grants the administrative
agencies the power to punish violations of police regulations with fines or
detention. Since the Constitution does not specifically grant power to the
federal courts to enforce the decisions of the administrative agencies when
the decisions deprive a private person of one of his vested rights, it is imposible to state that this is one of the express constitutional powers. However, reading Article 14 in connection with Article 104,1 we reach the following conclusion: Article 14 lays down all of the fundamental individual
rights guaranteed in the Mexican Constitution. Article 104 establishes the
general limits of jurisdiction of the judicial organs under the Mexican Constitution. The two taken together have been interpreted both by legislation
and by the case law to mean that the law in question may establish an
alternative; either a judicial proceeding or an administrative proceeding.
The law may also establish the right to select either or both of them (this is
done in the General Law of National Property, Articles 9 and 10). The
general presumption, therefore, that the courts are available for the protection of the individual, governs in all cases except those in which the Constitution itself has indicated the absolutely administrative character of the
procedure established. This it has done in the case of an expropriation of
property under a power similar to the United States' eminent domain, in
the matter of the means for the realization of agrarian reform (Article 27),
the expulsion of undesirable aliens, or matters affecting the general health
(Article 73, Section XIV), and matters of labor disputes (Article 123).
The enforcement measures available to the administrative agency are:
(a) the taking of private property; (b) the sale of private property in
order to pay a public obligation out of the proceeds; (c) the requiring of the
doing of certain acts on behalf of the party obligated to do them; (d) direct
coercion of individuals to prevent them from doing certain acts or to
force them to do certain acts; and (c) the indirect coercion of individuals by
means of penalties.
In addition there is the further possibility that non-compliance with
an administrative order may constitute a criminal offense. The decision as
to this separate matter is always one for the courts, and there must be a
proper proceeding in the courts before a penalty can be imposed. This is
controlled by Article 178 of the Criminal Code for the Federal District and
Territories, which is applicable in criminal matters throughout the Republic.
cit. stnqra note 2, at 419.
15. Id. at 447. This is the general judiciary clause.
14. 2 PEASLEE, o,
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It establishes a separate crime for the disobedience of a legitimate order of
any authority.
A final point should be mentioned as regards the efficacy of conduct
where that conduct by an administrative agency is based on its interpretation
of the common law. Any such act cannot be deemed to have an effect
since, as previously stated on various occasions, all administrative action
must be on the basis of specific statutory authority.
In conclusion, certain further details must be stated regarding the revocation of the act and the nullity of the act from a cause other than those
previously mentioned. Revocation is the unilateral administrative determination which consists of cancelling the effect of a previous act of discretionary type because it has been found to be inopportune, either in that it
is no longer in the public interest or that it was never in the public interest.
Such a revocation may have retroactive effect or it may be made only to
operate in futuro. In both cases, once the revocation has been made, it
becomes subject to the same constitutional limitations as any other vested
right. Rights may arise as much from the revocation of an act as from a
constitutional provision or a law made under'It. Very frequently rights
based on the revocation of an administrative termination may become a
proprietary obligation that can be enforced against the government.
It is impossible, within the brief compass of this article, to deal with all
of the aspects of the very important matter of nullity. The general principle
governing the matter of nullity may be stated as follows: When an action
is taken to realize something of benefit to the public interest, different criteria must be used for judging the validity of the act than would be used in
the matter of testing the validity of a private legal act. since in the latter
category the sole object is the satisfaction of private interests. The reasoning
which is applied in this field, unfortunately, has oftentimes been careless
and haphazard. The results are frequently anarchical. Rather than establishing one rule as regards the nullity of an administrative act, many possible
explanations for this phenomenon have been given.
The validity of an act consists in its capability of producing the effect
which the law attributes to it; the nullity, which is the reverse of this, consists
in the total or partial impossibility of its exercising its true legal role.
Based in general on the notions contained in the civil law, but without
expressly following them, three kinds of nullity are found. The first type
of nullity is that of invalidity. This, as previously explained, consists of
the total absence of an element essential to the validity of the act. It may
be the subject, the object, the expression or declaration of the will, the
motivation or a defect in the form of the act itself. Its consequence is to
bring forth something which appears to exist but does not exist in reality.
An appearance of an existing act results in its consideration and discussion,
but this mere resemblance is not sufficient to require a declaration of nullity.
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As soon as the lack of validity is discovered (and any interested party may
begin the proceeding) its incapacity to produce a legal effect is obvious, and
it cannot be made valid either by confirmation or prescription.
Examples of this type of invalidity would be if the author of the act is
a usurper, lacking in constitutional authority; if there has been no declaration of will or the declaration is made by an insane individual; if the object
of the act cannot exist or is impossible of fulfillment; if there is nothing
intended by the act; or if one of the solemn formal requirements was
omitted.
The second type is absolute nullity. This occurs when either the act
itself or the purpose of the act is expressly or impliedly prohibited by law
as contrary to public policy. These acts will produce their effect until the
nullity is declared. Any interested party may invoke the proceeding to declare the nullity and upon such a declaration all effects of the act are cancelled retroactively. This type of nullity also cannot be cured by confirmation or prescription.
Finally, there is the category of relative nullity. This is the result of a
defect which does not necessarily go to the essence of the act. The defect
may be such as a material error, deceit, duress or something which would
go to the will of the parties, and it cannot consist of anything other than
one of the less solemn parts of the formal requirements.

Thecse acts may be

declared null and void only at the request of the persons that the law deems
to be the victims of the particular defect. In the event that they are nullified, such nullification will be retroactive, but they are capable of being
confirmed by the elimination of the defect or made valid by the running of
the time necessary for the prescription of the attack.
It is the opinion of this writer that there should be no differentiation
between invalidity and absolute nullity. If the juridical act is one that
apparently fulfills the requisites of the law, the absolute lack of capacity
means that the act does not exist in reality and, therefore, while it does
have the appearance, both of the cases effectually fall within the category
of absolute nullity.
The nullity of administrative acts creates a serious problem, particularly
in connection with the determination of the competence of the authority to
declare nullity, the time when the nullity may be declared and the retroactive destruction of rights based on the act which has been declared null
and void.
The general principles established by the legislation and the court
decisions is that the nullification may be made either by the same authority
or its next superior in the administrative hierarchy, with the exception of
the administrative tribunals. This is particularly true where the nullity is
based on the fact that the act violates public policy. At times, however,
when a question of the nullification of the decision favorable to a private
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individual arises, the law requires that this case be submitted either to an
administrative or to a judicial tribunal.
Private persons are in a different situation from the public
authorities. The administrative law does not have as its main purpose the
protection of private interests. Therefore, in general, the period of time
within which the nullification proceeding may be brought on behalf of a
private person is limited. The statute of limitations is usually a very short
one-so short as to cancel the right of petition for nullification within a
peremptory term.
It must be stated that the retroactive nullification of acts either
absolutely void or voidable is not an absolute right. This also is due to the
fact that the public interest intervenes. Retroactive nullification may not,
even to protect legitimate interests of the individual, be granted. The
grant of nullification depends on an affirmative declaration contained in
the law and its reasonable interpretation by the courts through their case
decisions. For example, where there are acts performed by de facto
officers, the public interest may supervene the private interest, and the
de facto character of the officers may not be pointed out by the private
interest in order to annul their act.
In conclusion, therefore, it should be statcd that in the field of
establishing the nullity of administrative procedure, the general trend of
the development of Mexican administrative law is again shown. The
administrative law is the servant of the public interest. A reasonable
balance has been struck to protect the individual rights guaranteed in
the Constitution, and the courts have extended the amparo proceedings
so that protection is real rather than theoretical. Beyond the narrow
limits of this constitutional protection, however, the public interest is
usually preferred to the private interest.

We regret that several typographical errors appeared in Morrison, Maintenance and
Cure and Farrell v. United States, in 6 MIAMI L.Q. 168 (Feb. 1952).
Page 176, n. 46, should read, ". . . where a seaman engaged upon his own personal
affairs, and there injured, could not recover maintenance and cure."
The last paragraph on page 177 should begin, "It is here interesting to note that
in 1937--one year before Collins-in Hogan v. S-S. (. M. Danziger.5 1 . . ."
The first sentence of the last paragraph on page 185 should read, "Now can this
be taken to say that the result would have been the same had Farrell been two days, or
two weeks, overleave rather than two hours?"
The fourth sentence in the first full paragraph on page 186 should read, "In short,
the provision is aimed at injured seamen, but not necessarily seamen who have been
cursed with an incurable illness."

